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When is a Function Securely Computable?
Himanshu Tyagi, Prakash Narayan and Piyush Gupta
Abstract
A subset of a set of terminals that observe correlated signals seek to compute a given function of
the signals using public communication. It is required that the value of the function be kept secret from
an eavesdropper with access to the communication. We show that the function is securely computable
if and only if its entropy is less than the “aided secret key” capacity of an associated secrecy generation
model, for which a single-letter characterization is provided.
Index Terms
Aided secret key, balanced coloring lemma, function computation, maximum common function,
omniscience, secret key capacity, secure computability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an online auction, m − 1 bidders acting independently of each other, randomly place one of k
bids on a secure server. After a period of independent daily bidding, the server posts a cryptic message
on a public website. Our results show that for m > k + 1, such a message exists from which each
bidder can deduce securely the highest bids, but no message exists to allow any of them to identify
securely the winners.
In general, suppose that the terminals in M = {1, . . . ,m} observe correlated signals, and that a
subset A = {1, . . . , a} of them are required to compute “securely” a given (single-letter) function g of
all the signals. To this end, following their observations, all the terminals are allowed to communicate
interactively over a public noiseless channel of unlimited capacity, with all such communication being
observed by all the terminals. The terminals in A seek to compute g in such a manner as to keep
its value information theoretically secret from an eavesdropper with access to the public interterminal
communication. See Figure 1. A typical application arises in a wireless network of colocated sensors
which seek to compute a given function of their correlated measurements using public communication
that does not give away the value of the function.
Our goal is to characterize necessary and sufficient conditions under which such secure computation
is feasible. We formulate a new Shannon theoretic multiterminal source model that addresses the
elemental question: When can a function g be computed so that its value is independent of the public
communication used in its computation?
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Fig. 1. Secure computation of g
We establish that the answer to this question is innately connected to a problem of secret key (SK)
generation in which all the terminals in M seek to generate “secret common randomness” at the largest
rate possible, when the terminals in Ac = M/A are provided with side information for limited use,
by means of public communication from which an eavesdropper can glean only a negligible amount of
information about the SK. The public communication from a terminal can be any function of its own
observed signal and of all previous communication. Side information is provided to the terminals in Ac
in the form of the value of g, and can be used only for recovering the key. Such a key, termed an aided
secret key (ASK), constitutes a modification of the original notion of a SK in [14], [1], [6], [7]. The
largest rate of such an ASK, which can be used for encrypted communication, is the ASK capacity C.
Since a securely computable function g for A will yield an ASK (for M) of rate equal to its entropy
H , it is clear that g necessarily must satisfy H ≤ C. We show that surprisingly, H < C is a sufficient
condition for the existence of a protocol for the secure computation of g for A. When all the terminals
in M seek to compute g securely, the corresponding ASK capacity reduces to the standard SK capacity
for M [6], [7]. We also show that a function that is securely computed by A can be augmented by
residual secret common randomness to yield a SK for A of optimum rate.
We also present the capacity for a general ASK model involving arbitrary side information at the
secrecy-seeking set of terminals for key recovery alone. Its capacity is characterized in terms of the
classic concept of “maximum common function” [8]. Although this result is not needed in full dose for
characterizing secure computability, it remains of independent interest.
We do not tackle the difficult problem of determining the minimum rate of public communication
needed for the secure computation of g, which remains open even in the absence of a secrecy constraint
3[11]. Nor do we fashion efficient protocols for this purpose. Instead, our mere objective in this work is
to find conditions for the existence of such protocols.
The study of problems of function computation, with and without secrecy requirements, has a long
and varied history to which we can make only a skimpy allusion here. Examples include: algorithms for
exact function computation by multiple parties (cf. e.g., [20], [9], [10]); algorithms for asymptotically
accurate (in observation length) function computation (cf. e.g., [18], [13]); exact function computation
with secrecy (cf. e.g., [17]); and problems of oblivious transfer [16], [2].
Our results in Section III are organized in three parts: capacity of ASK model; characterization of
the secure computability of g; and a decomposition result for the total entropy of the model. Proofs are
provided in Section IV and concluding remarks in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let X1, . . . , Xm, m ≥ 2, be rvs with finite alphabets X1, . . . ,Xm, respectively. For any nonempty
set A ⊆ M = {1, . . . ,m}, we denote XA = (Xi, i ∈ A). Similarly, for real numbers R1, . . . , Rm
and A ⊆ M, we denote RA = (Ri, i ∈ A). Let Ac be the set M\A. We denote n i.i.d. repetitions
of XM = (X1, . . . , Xm) with values in XM = X1 × . . .× Xm by XnM = (Xn1 , . . . , Xnm) with values
in XnM = Xn1 × . . . × Xnm. Following [6], given ǫ > 0, for rvs U, V, we say that U is ǫ-recoverable
from V if Pr (U 6= f(V )) ≤ ǫ for some function f(V ) of V . All logarithms and exponentials are with
respect to the base 2.
We consider a multiterminal source model for secure computation with public communication; this
basic model was introduced in [6] in the context of SK generation with public transaction. Terminals
1, . . . ,m observe, respectively, the sequences Xn1 , . . . , Xnm, of length n. Let g : XM → Y be a given
mapping, where Y is a finite alphabet. For n ≥ 1, the mapping gn : XnM → Yn is defined by
gn(xnM) = (g(x11, . . . , xm1), . . . , g(x1n, . . . , xmn)),
xnM = (x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
m) ∈ XnM.
For convenience, we shall denote the rv gn (XnM) by Gn, n ≥ 1, and, in particular, G1 = g (XM)
simply by G. The terminals in a given set A ⊆ M wish to “compute securely” the function gn(xnM)
for xnM in XnM. To this end, the terminals are allowed to communicate over a noiseless public channel,
possibly interactively in several rounds. Randomization at the terminals is permitted; we assume that
terminal i generates a rv Ui, i ∈ M, such that U1, . . . , Um and XnM are mutually independent. While
the cardinalities of range spaces of Ui, i ∈ M, are unrestricted, we assume that H (UM) <∞.
Definition 1. Assume without any loss of generality that the communication of the terminals in M
occurs in consecutive time slots in r rounds; such communication is described in terms of the mappings
f11, . . . , f1m, f21, . . . , f2m, . . . , fr1, . . . , frm,
with fji corresponding to a message in time slot j by terminal i, 1 ≤ j ≤ r, 1 ≤ i ≤ m; in general,
fji is allowed to yield any function of (Ui, Xni ) and of previous communication described in terms of
{fkl : k < j, l ∈ M or k = j, l < i}. The corresponding rvs representing the communication will be
4depicted collectively as
F = {F11, . . . , F1m, F21, . . . , F2m, . . . , Fr1, . . . , Frm},
where F = F(n)(UM, XnM). A special form of such communication will be termed noninteractive
communication if F = (F1, ..., Fm), where Fi = fi (Xni ), i ∈ M.
Definition 2. For ǫn > 0, n ≥ 1, we say that g is ǫn-securely computable (ǫn- SC) by (the terminals
in) a given set A ⊆ M with |A| ≥ 1 from observations of length n, randomization UM and public
communication F = F(n), if
(i) gn is ǫn- recoverable from (Ui, Xni ,F) for every i ∈ A, i.e., there exists ĝ(n)i satisfying
Pr
(
ĝ
(n)
i (Ui, X
n
i ,F) 6= Gn
)
≤ ǫn, i ∈ A, (1)
and
(ii) gn satisfies the “strong” secrecy condition1
I(Gn ∧ F) ≤ ǫn. (2)
By definition, an ǫn-SC function g is recoverable (as gn) at the terminals in A and is effectively
concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public communication F.
Definition 3. We say that g is securely computable by A if g is ǫn- SC by A from observations of
length n, suitable randomization UM and public communication F, such that lim
n
ǫn = 0.
III. WHEN IS g SECURELY COMPUTABLE?
We consider first the case when all the terminals in M wish to compute securely the function g,
i.e., A =M. Our result for this case will be seen to be linked inherently to the standard concept of SK
capacity for a multiterminal source model [6], [7], and serves to motivate our approach to the general
case when A ⊆M.
Definition 4. [6], [7] For ǫn > 0, n ≥ 1, a function K of (UM, XnM) is an ǫn-secret key (ǫn-SK)
for (the terminals in) a given set2 A′ ⊆ M with |A′| ≥ 2, achievable from observations of length n,
randomization UM and public communication F = F(n)(UM, XnM) as above if
(i) K is ǫn-recoverable from (Ui, Xni ,F) for every i ∈ A′;
(ii) K satisfies the “strong” secrecy condition
log |K| −H(K | F) = log |K| −H(K) + I(K ∧ F) ≤ ǫn, (3)
where K = K(n) denotes the set of possible values of K . The SK capacity C(A′) for A′ is the largest
rate lim
n
(1/n) log |K(n)| of ǫn-SKs for A′ as above, such that lim
n
ǫn = 0.
1The notion of strong secrecy for SK generation was introduced in [15], and developed further in [4], [5].
2For reasons of notation that will be apparent later, we distinguish between the secrecy seeking set A′ ⊆ M and the set
A ⊆M pursuing secure computation.
5Remarks. (i) The secrecy condition (3) is tantamount jointly to a nearly uniform distribution for K (i.e.,
log |K| −H(K) is small) and to the near independence of K and F (i.e., I(K ∧ F) is small).
(ii) For the trivial case |A′| = 1, clearly C(A′) = H(XA′).
A single-letter characterization of the SK capacity C(A′) is provided in [6], [7].
Theorem 1. [6], [7] The SK capacity C(A′) equals
C(A′) = H(XM)−RCO(A′), (4)
where
RCO(A′) = min
RM∈R(A′)
m∑
i=1
Ri (5)
with
R(A′) =
{
RM : RB ≥ H(XB | XBc), B  M,A′ * B
}
. (6)
Furthermore, the SK capacity can be achieved with noninteractive communication and without recourse
to randomization at the terminals in M.
Remark. The SK capacity C(A′) is not increased if the secrecy condition (3) is replaced by either of
the following weaker requirements 3 [14], [6]:
1
n
I(K ∧ F) ≤ ǫn and 1
n
(log |K| −H(K)) ≤ ǫn, (7)
or
1
n
I(K ∧ F) ≤ ǫn and lim sup
n
1
n
log |K| <∞. (8)
We recall from [6] that RCO(A′) has the operational significance of being the smallest rate of
“communication for omniscience” for A′, namely the smallest rate lim
n
(1/n) log ‖F(n)‖ of suitable
communication for the terminals in M whereby XnM is ǫn-recoverable from (Ui, Xni ,Fn) at each
terminal i ∈ A′, with lim
n
ǫn = 0; here ‖F(n)‖ denotes the cardinality of the set of values of F(n).
Thus, RCO(A′) is the smallest rate of interterminal communication among the terminals in M that
enables every terminal in A′ to reconstruct with high probability all the sequences observed by all the
other terminals in M with the cooperation of the terminals in M/A′. The resulting omniscience for A′
corresponds to total “common randomness” of rate H(XM). The notion of omniscience, which plays
a central role in SK generation for the multiterminal source model [6], will play a material role in the
secure computation of g as well.
Noting that gn : XnM → Yn implies
1
n
log |gn (XnM)| ≤ log |XM|, (9)
3When randomization at the terminals in M is not permitted, the converse proof in [6] uses only the first part of (7) or (8).
When randomization is allowed, since the cardinality of the range space of UM is unrestricted, the converse proof in [6] uses
additionally the second part of (7) or (8).
6a comparison of the conditions in (2, 9) and (8) that must be met by a securely computable g and a
SK K , respectively, shows for a given g to be securely computable, it is necessary that
H(G) ≤ C(M). (10)
Remarkably, it transpires that H(G) < C(M) is a sufficient condition for g to be securely computable,
and constitutes our first result.
Theorem 2. A function g is securely computable by M if
H(G) < C(M). (11)
Conversely, if g is securely computable by M, then H(G) ≤ C(M).
Theorem 2 is, in fact, a special case of our main result in Theorem 5 below.
Example 1. Let m = 2, and let X1 and X2 be {0, 1}-valued rvs with
PX1(1) = p = 1− PX1(0), 0 < p < 1,
PX2|X1(1 | 1) = PX2|X1(0 | 0) = 1− δ, 0 < δ <
1
2
.
Let g(x1, x2) = x1 + x2 mod 2.
From [14], [1] (and also Theorem 1 above), C({1, 2}) = h(p ∗ δ)−h(δ), where p ∗ δ = (1− p)δ+
p(1− δ). Since H(G) = h(δ), by Theorem 2 g is securely computable if
2h(δ) < h(p ∗ δ). (12)
We give a simple scheme for the secure computation of g when p = 12 , that relies on Wyner’s well-
known method for Slepian-Wolf data compression [19] and a derived SK generation scheme in [22],
[21]. We can write
Xn1 = X
n
2 +G
n mod 2 (13)
with Gn being independent separately of Xn2 and Xn1 . We observe as in [19] that there exists a
binary linear code, of rate ∼= 1 − h(δ), with parity check matrix P such that Xn1 , and so Gn, is
ǫn-recoverable from (F1, Xn2 ) at terminal 2, where the Slepian-Wolf codeword F1 = PXn1 constitutes
public communication from terminal 1, and where ǫn decays to 0 exponentially rapidly in n. Let Ĝn be
the estimate of Gn thereby formed at terminal 2. Further, let K = K(Xn1 ) be the location of Xn1 in the
coset of the standard array corresponding to P. By the previous observation, K too is ǫn-recoverable
from (F1, Xn2 ) at terminal 2. From [22], [21], K constitutes a “perfect” SK for terminals 1 and 2, of
rate ∼= I(X1 ∧X2) = 1− h(δ), and satisfying
I(K ∧ F1) = 0. (14)
Also, observe from (13) that K = K(Xn1 ) = K(Xn2 +Gn) and F1 = F1(Xn1 ) = F1(Xn2 + Gn), and
for each fixed value of Gn, the (common) arguments of K and F1 have the same distribution as Xn1 .
7Hence by (14),
I(K ∧ F1, Gn) = I(K ∧ F1 | Gn) = 0, (15)
since I(K ∧Gn) ≤ I(Xn1 ∧Gn) = 0.
Then terminal 2 communicates Ĝn in encrypted form as
F2 = Ĝn +K mod 2
(all represented in bits), with encryption feasible since
H(G) = h(δ) < 1− h(δ) ∼= 1
n
H(K),
by the sufficient condition (12). Terminal 1 then decrypts F2 using K to recover Ĝn. The computation
of gn is secure since
I(Gn ∧ F1, F2) = I(Gn ∧ F1) + I(Gn ∧ F2 | F1)
is small; specifically, the first term equals 0 since I(Gn ∧ F1) ≤ I(Gn ∧ Xn1 ) = 0, while the second
term is bounded using (15) according to
I(Gn ∧ F2 | F1) = H(Ĝn +K | F1)−H(Ĝn +K | F1, Gn)
≤ H(K)−H(Gn +K | F1, Gn) + δn
= I(K ∧ F1, Gn) + δn = δn,
where the inequality follows by Fano’s inequality and the exponential decay of ǫn to 0.
Next, we turn to the general model for the secure computability of g by a given set A ⊆M. Again
in the manner of (10), it is clear that a necessary condition is
H(G) ≤ C(A).
In contrast, when A  M, H(G) < C(A) is not sufficient for g to be securely computable by A as
seen by the following simple example.
Example 2. Let m = 3, A = {1, 2} and consider rvs X1, X2, X3 with X1 = X2, where X1 is
independent of X3 and H(X3) < H(X1). Let g be defined by g(x1, x2, x3) = x3, xi ∈ Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Clearly, C({1, 2}) = H(X1). Therefore, H(G) = H(X3) < C({1, 2}). However, for g to be computed
by the terminals 1 and 2, its value must be conveyed to them necessarily by public communication from
terminal 3. Thus, g is not securely computable.
Interestingly, the secure computability of g can be examined in terms of a new SK generation
problem that is formulated next.
A. Secret Key Aided by Side Information
We consider an extension of the SK generation problem in Definition 4, which involves additional
side information ZnA′ that is correlated with XnM and is provided to the terminals in A′ for use in only
8the recovery stage of SK generation; however, the public communication F remains as in Definition
1. Formally, the extension is described in terms of generic rvs (X1, . . . , Xm, {Zi, i ∈ A′}), where the
rvs Zi too take values in finite sets Zi, i in A′. We note that the full force of this extension will not
be needed to characterize the secure computability of g; an appropriate particularization will suffice.
Nevertheless, this concept is of independent interest.
Definition 5. A function K of (UM, XnM, ZnA′) is an ǫn- secret key aided by side information ZnA′ (ǫn-
ASK) for the terminals A′ ⊆ M, |A′| ≥ 2, achievable from observations of length n, randomization
UM and public communication F = F(UM, XnM) if it satisfies the conditions in Definition 4 with
(Ui, X
n
i , Z
n
i ,F) in the role of (Ui, Xni ,F) in condition (i). The corresponding ASK capacity C(A′, ZA′)
is defined analogously as in Definition 4.
In contrast with the omniscience rate of H(XM) that appears in the passage following Theorem
1, now an underlying analogous notion of omniscience will involve total common randomness of rate
exceeding H(XM). Specifically, the enhanced common randomness rate will equal the entropy of the
“maximum common function” (mcf) of the rvs (XM, Zi)i∈A, introduced for a pair of rvs in [8] (see
also [3, Problem 3.4.27]).
Definition 6. [8] For two rvs Q,R with values in finite sets Q,R, the equivalence relation q ∼ q′
in Q holds if there exist N ≥ 1 and sequences (q0, q1, . . . , qN ) in Q with q0 = q, qN = q′ and
(r1, . . . , rN ) in R satisfying Pr (Q = ql−1, R = rl) > 0 and Pr (Q = ql, R = rl) > 0, l = 1, . . . , N .
Denote the corresponding equivalence classes in Q by Q1, . . . ,Qk. Similarly, let R1, . . . ,Rk′ denote
the equivalence classes in R. As argued in [8], k = k′ and for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k,
Pr (Q ∈ Qi | R ∈ Rj) = Pr (R ∈ Rj | Q ∈ Qi) =
{
1, i = j,
0, i 6= j.
The mcf of the rvs Q,R is a rv mcf(Q,R) with values in {1, . . . , k} and pmf
Pr (mcf(Q,R) = i) = Pr (Q ∈ Qi) = Pr (Q ∈ Qi, R ∈ Ri) , i = 1, . . . , k.
For rvs Q1, ..., Qm taking values in finite alphabets, we define the mcf(Q1, ..., Qm) recursively by
mcf(Q1, ..., Qm) = mcf
(
mcf(Q1, ..., Qm−1), Qm
) (16)
with mcf(Q1, Q2) as above.
Definition 7. With Qn denoting n i.i.d. repetitions of the rv Q, we define
mcf
n(Q1, ..., Qm) = {mcf (Q1t, ..., Qmt)}nt=1 . (17)
Note that mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm) is a function of each individual Qni , i = 1, ...,m.
Remark. As justification for the definition (16), consider a rv ξ that satisfies
H(ξ | Qi) = 0, i = 1, ...,m (18)
and suppose for any other rv ξ′ satisfying (18) that H(ξ) ≥ H(ξ′). Then Lemma 3 below shows that
ξ must satisfy H(ξ) = H(mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)).
9The following result for the mcf of m ≥ 2 rvs is a simple extension of the classic result for m = 2
[8, Theorem 1].
Lemma 3. Given 0 < ǫ < 1, if ξ(n) is ǫ-recoverable from Qni for each i = 1, ...,m, then
lim sup
n
1
n
H
(
ξ(n)
)
≤ H(mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)). (19)
Proof: The proof involves a recursive application of [8, Lemma, Section 4] to mcf(Q1, ..., Qm) in (16),
and is provided in Appendix A.
We are now in a position to characterize ASK capacity. In a manner analogous to Theorem 1, this
is done in terms of H(mcf(XM, Zi)i∈A′) and the smallest rate of communication RCO(A′, ZA′) for
each terminal in A′ to attain omniscience that corresponds to n i.i.d. repetitions of mcf(XM, Zi)i∈A′ .
Theorem 4. The ASK capacity C(A′;ZA′) equals
C(A′;ZA′) = H(mcf((XM, Zi)i∈A′))−RCO(A′;ZA′)
where
RCO(A′;ZA′) = min
RM∈R(A′;ZA′ )
∑
i∈M
Ri
with
R(A′;ZA′) =
{
RM : RB ≥ max
j∈Bc∩A′
H(XB | XBc , Zj), B  M,A′ * B
}
. (20)
The proof of Theorem 4 is along the same lines as that of Theorem 1 [6] and is provided in
Appendix B.
The remark following Theorem 1 also applies to the ASK capacity C(A′;ZA′), as will be seen
from the proof of Theorem 4.
B. Characterization of Secure Computability
If g is securely computable by the terminals in A, then Gn constitutes an ASK for M under the
constraint (8), of rate H(G), with side information in the form of Gn provided only to the terminals in
Ac in the recovery stage of SK generation. Thus, a necessary condition for g to be securely computable
by A, in the manner of (10), is
H(G) ≤ C(M;ZM), (21)
where ZM = ZM(A) = {Zi}i∈M with
Zi =
{
0, i ∈ A
G, i ∈ Ac. (22)
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By particularizing Theorem 4 to the choice of ZM as above, the right side of (21) reduces to
C(M;ZM) = H(XM)−RCO(M;ZM) (23)
where
RCO(M;ZM) = min
RM∈R(M;ZM)
∑
i∈M
Ri
with
R(M;ZM) =
{
RM : RB ≥
{
H(XB | XBc), B  M,A * B
H(XB | XBc , G), B  M,A ⊆ B
}
.
Our main result says that the necessary condition (21) is tight.
Theorem 5. A function g is securely computable by A ⊆M if
H(G) < C(M;ZM). (24)
Furthermore, under the condition above, g is securely computable with noninteractive communication
and without recourse to randomization at the terminals in M.
Conversely, if g is securely computable by A ⊆M, then H(G) ≤ C(M;ZM).
Remarks. (i) It is easy to see that C(M) ≤ C (M;ZM) = C (M;ZM(A)) ≤ C(A). In particular, the
second inequality holds since in the context of C (M;ZM) the side information for recovery ZM in
(22) is not provided to the terminals in A and by noting that a SK for M is also a SK for A.
(ii) Observe in Example 2 that C (M;ZM) = C(M) = 0 and so, by Theorem 5, g is not securely
computable as noted earlier.
Example 3. For the auction example in Section I, A = {1, ...,m− 1} and X1, ..., Xm−1 are i.i.d. rvs
distributed uniformly on {1, ..., k}, while Xm = (X1, ..., Xm−1). Let g1(x1, ..., xm) = max
1≤i≤m−1
xi and
g2(x1, ..., xm) = arg max
1≤i≤m−1
xi. Then, straightforward computation yields for k < m− 1 that
H(G1) < log k < H(G2) = log(m− 1),
and for both g1, g2 that
C (M;ZM) = C(M),
where, by Theorem 1,
C(M) = H(XM)−RCO(M) = (m− 1) log k − (m− 2) log k = log k.
By Theorem 5, g1 is securely computable whereas g2 is not. In fact, g2 is not securely computable
by any terminal i ∈ {1, ...,m − 1}. This, too, is implied by Theorem 5 upon nothing that for each
i ∈ {1, ...,m− 1} and a restricted choice A = {i},
C (M;ZM(A)) = H(Xi) = log k < log(m− 1) = H(G2),
where the first equality is a consequence of remark (i) following Theorem 5 and remark (ii) after
Definition 4.
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C. A Decomposition Result
The sufficiency condition (24) prompts the following two natural questions: Does the difference
C (M;ZM)−H(G) possess an operational significance? If g is securely computable by the terminals
in A, clearly Gn forms a SK for A. Can Gn be augmented suitably to form a SK for A of maximum
achievable rate?
The answers to both these questions are in the affirmative. In particular, our approach to the second
question involves a characterization of the minimum rate of communication for omniscience for A,
under the additional requirement that this communication be independent of Gn. Specifically, we show
below that for a securely computable function g, this minimum rate remains RCO(A) (see (6)).
Addressing the first question, we introduce a rv Kg = K(n)g such that K = (Kg, Gn) constitutes
an ǫn-ASK for M with side information ZM as in (22) and satisfying the additional requirement
I (Kg ∧Gn) ≤ ǫn. (25)
Let the largest rate limn(1/n) log |K(n)g | of such an ASK be Cg (M;ZM). Observe that since K is
required to be nearly independent of F, where F is the public communication involved in its formation,
it follows by (25) that Kg is nearly independent of (Gn,F).
Turning to the second question, in the same vein let K ′g be a rv such that K ′ =
(
K ′g, G
n
)
constitutes
an ǫn-SK for A ⊆M and satisfying (25). Let Cg(A) denote the largest rate of K ′g. As noted above, K ′g
will be nearly independent of (Gn,F′), where F′ is the public communication involved in the formation
of K ′.
Proposition 6. For A ⊆M, it holds that
(i) Cg (M;ZM(A)) = C (M;ZM(A)) −H(G),
(ii) Cg(A) = C(A) −H(G).
Remarks. (i) For the case A =M, both (i) and (ii) above reduce to Cg(M) = C(M)−H(G).
(ii) Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 (ii) lead to the observation
H(XM) = RCO(A) +H(G) + Cg(A),
which admits the following heuristic interpretation. The “total randomness” XnM that corresponds
to omniscience decomposes into three “nearly mutually independent” components: a minimum-sized
communication for omniscience for A and the independent parts of an optimum-rate SK for A composed
of Gn and K ′g.
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREM 5 AND PROPOSITION 6
A. Proof of Theorem 5
The necessity of (21) follows by the comments preceding Theorem 5.
The sufficiency of (24) will be established by showing the existence of noninteractive public
communication comprising source codes that enable omniscience corresponding to XnM at the terminals
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in A, and thereby the computation of g. Furthermore, the corresponding codewords are selected so as
to be simultaneously independent of Gn, thus assuring security.
First, from (24) and (23), there exists δ > 0 such that RCO(M;ZM) + δ < H(XM|G), using
G = g(XM). For each i and Ri ≥ 0, consider a (map-valued) rv Ji that is uniformly distributed on
the family Ji of all mappings Xni → {1, . . . , ⌈exp(nRi)⌉}, i ∈ M. The rvs J1, ..., Jm, XnM are taken
to be mutually independent.
Fix ǫ, ǫ′, with ǫ′ > mǫ and ǫ + ǫ′ < 1. It follows from the proof of the general source network
coding theorem [3, Lemma 3.1.13 and Theorem 3.1.14] that for all sufficiently large n,
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : XnM is ǫn-recoverable from
(
Xni , jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
)
, Zni
)
, i ∈M
})
≥ 1− ǫ, (26)
provided RM = (R1, ..., Rm) ∈ R(M;ZM), where ǫn vanishes exponentially rapidly in n. This
assertion follows exactly as in the proof of [6, Proposition 1, with A =M] but with X˜i there equal to
(Xi, Zi) rather than Xi, i ∈ M. In particular, we shall choose RM ∈ R(M;ZM) such that
m∑
i=1
Ri ≤ RCO(M;ZM) + δ
2
. (27)
Below we shall establish that
Pr ({jM ∈ JM : I (jM(XnM) ∧Gn) ≥ ǫn}) ≤ ǫ′, (28)
for all n sufficiently large, to which end it suffices to show that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : I
(
ji(X
n
i ) ∧Gn, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
≥ ǫn
m
})
≤ ǫ
′
m
, i ∈M, (29)
since
I (jM (X
n
M) ∧Gn) =
m∑
i=1
I
(
ji (X
n
i ) ∧Gn | j1 (Xn1 ) , . . . , ji−1
(
Xni−1
))
≤
m∑
i=1
I
(
ji (X
n
i ) ∧Gn, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
.
Then it would follow from (26), (28) and definition of ZM in (21) that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : Gn is ǫn-recoverable from
(
Xni , jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
, i ∈ A,
and I(jM(XnM) ∧Gn) < ǫn
})
≥ 1− ǫ− ǫ′.
This shows the existence of a particular realization jM of JM such that Gn is ǫn-SC from
(Xni , jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
)
) for each i ∈ A.
It now remains to prove (29). Fix i ∈ M and note that for each ji ∈ Ji, with ‖ji‖ denoting the
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cardinality of the (image) set ji(Xni ),
I
(
ji
(
Xni
) ∧Gn, jM\{i} (XnM\{i}))
≤ I
(
ji(X
n
i ) ∧Gn, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
+ log ‖ji‖ −H (ji(Xni ))
= D(ji(X
n
i ), (G
n, jM\{i}(X
n
M\{i})‖Uji(Xni ) ×
(
Gn, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
, (30)
where the right side above denotes the (Kullback-Leibler) divergence between the joint pmf of
ji(X
n
i ),
(
Gn, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
and the product of the uniform pmf on ji(Xni ) and the pmf of(
Gn, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
. Using [6, Lemma 1], the right side of (30) is bounded above further by
svar log
‖ji‖
svar
, (31)
where svar = svar(ji(Xni );Gn, jM\{i}(XnM\{i}) is the variational distance between the pmfs in the
divergence above. Therefore, to prove (29), it suffices to show that
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : svar
(
ji(X
n
i );G
n, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
≥ ǫn
m
})
≤ ǫ
′
m
, i ∈ M, (32)
on account of the fact that log ‖ji(Xni )‖ = O(n), and the exponential decay to 0 of ǫn. Defining
J˜i =
{
jM\{i} ∈ JM\{i} : XnM is ǫn-recoverable from
(
Xni , jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
)
, Zni
)}
,
we have by (26) that Pr
(
JM\{i} ∈ J˜i
)
≥ 1− ǫ. Thus, in (32),
Pr
({
jM ∈ JM : svar
(
ji (X
n
i ) ;G
n, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
≥ ǫn
m
})
≤ ǫ +
∑
jM\{i}∈J˜i
Pr
(
JM\{i} = jM\{i}
)×
Pr
({
ji ∈ Ji : svar
(
ji(X
n
i );G
n, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
≥ ǫn
m
})
,
since Ji is independent of JM\{i}. Thus, (32), and hence (29), will follow upon showing that
Pr
({
ji ∈ Ji : svar
(
ji(X
n
i );G
n, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
≥ ǫn
m
})
≤ ǫ
′
m
− ǫ, jM\{i} ∈ J˜i, (33)
for all n sufficiently large. Fix jM\{i} ∈ J˜i. We take recourse to Lemma C2 in Appendix C, and set
U = XnM, U
′ = Xni , V = G
n, h = jM\{i}, and
U0 =
{
xnM ∈ XnM : xnM = ψi
(
xni , jM\{i}
(
xnM\{i}
)
, gn (xnM) 1 (i ∈ Ac)
)}
for some mapping ψi. By the definition of J˜i,
Pr (U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− ǫn,
so that condition (C2)(i) preceding Lemma C2 is met. Condition (C2)(ii), too, is met since conditioned
on the events in (C2)(ii), only those xnM ∈ U0 can occur that are determined uniquely by their ith
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components xni .
Upon choosing
d = exp
[
n
(
H(XM|G)− δ
6
)]
,
in (C3), the hypotheses of Lemma C2 are satisfied with λ = √ǫn, for an appropriate exponentially
vanishing ǫn. Then, by Lemma C2, with
r = ⌈exp[nRi]⌉ , r′ =
exp
n
 ∑
l∈M\{i}
Rl +
δ
6
 ,
and with Ji in the role of φ, we get from (C4) and (27) that
Pr
({
ji ∈ Ji : svar
(
ji(X
n
i );G
n, jM\{i}
(
XnM\{i}
))
≥ 14√ǫn
})
decays to 0 doubly exponentially in n, which proves (33). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
B. Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Since the rv (K(n)g , Gn), with nearly independent components, constitutes an ASK for M with
side information ZM as in (22), it is clear that
H(G) + Cg (M;ZM) ≤ C (M;ZM) . (34)
In order to prove the reverse of (34), we show that C (M;ZM) − H(G) is an achievable ASK rate
for Kg that additionally satisfies (25). First, note that in the proof of Theorem 5, the assertions (26)
and (29) mean that for all sufficiently large n, there exists a public communication FM, say, such that
I(FM ∧Gn) < ǫn and XnM is ǫn-recoverable from (Xni , FM, Zni ) for every i ∈ M, with lim
n
ǫn = 0.
Fix 0 < τ < δ, where δ is as in the proof of Theorem 5. Apply Lemma C2, choosing
U = U ′ = XnM, U0 = XnM, V = Gn, h = FM, d = exp
[
n
(
H (XM|G)− τ
6
)]
, (35)
whereby the hypothesis (C3) of Lemma C2 is satisfied for all n sufficiently large. Fixing
r′ =
⌈
exp
[
n
(
RCO (M;ZM) + τ
2
)]⌉
,
by Lemma C2 a randomly chosen φ of rate
1
n
log r = H(XM|G)−RCO (M;ZM)− τ = C (M;ZM)−H(G) − τ
will yield an ASK Kg = K(n)g = φ (XnM) which is nearly independent of (FM, Gn) (and, in particular,
satisfies (25)) with positive probability, for all n sufficiently large.
(ii) The proof can be completed as that of part (i) upon showing that for a securely computable g, for
all τ > 0 and n sufficiently large, there exists a public communication F ′M that meets the following
requirements: its rate does not exceed RCO(A) + τ ; I(F ′M ∧ Gn) < ǫn; and XnM is ǫn-recoverable
from (Xni , F ′M) for every i ∈ A. To that end, for RM = (R1, ..., Rm) ∈ R(M;ZM) as in the proof
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of Theorem 5, consider R′M = (R′1, ..., R′m) ∈ R(A) that satisfies R′i ≤ Ri for all i ∈M and
m∑
i=1
R′i ≤ RCO(A) + τ,
noting that R (M;ZM) ⊆ R(A). Further, for JM and JM as in that proof, define a (map-valued) rv
J ′i that is uniformly distributed on the family J ′i of all mappings from
{1, . . . , ⌈exp(nRi)⌉} to {1, . . . , ⌈exp(nR′i)⌉}, i ∈M. The random variables J1, ..., Jm,
J ′1, ..., J
′
m, X
n
M are taken to be mutually independent. Define J 0M as the set of mappings jM ∈ JM
for which there exists a j′M ∈ J ′M such that XnM is ǫn-recoverable from
(Xni , j
′
M (jM (X
n
M))) for every i ∈ A. By the general source network coding theorem [3, Lemma 3.1.13
and Theorem 3.1.14], applied to the random mapping J ′M (JM), it follows that for all sufficiently large
n,
Pr
(
JM ∈ J0M
) ≥ 1− ǫ.
This, together with (26) and (29) in the proof of Theorem 5, imply that for a securely computable g
there exist jM ∈ JM and j′M ∈ J ′M for which the public communication F ′M , j′M(jM) satisfies
the aforementioned requirements. Finally, apply Lemma C2 with U,U ′,U0, V and d as in (35) but with
h = F ′M and
r′ =
⌈
exp
[
n
(
RCO (A) + τ
2
)]⌉
.
As in the proof above of part (i), a SK K ′g = K ′(n)g of rate
1
n
log r = H(XM|G)−RCO (A)− τ = C (A)−H(G)− τ
which is nearly independent of (F ′M, Gn) (and, hence, satisfies (25)) exists for all n sufficiently large.
V. DISCUSSION
We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computability involving function
entropy and ASK capacity. The latter is the largest rate of a SK for a new model in which side information
is provided for use in only the recovery stage of SK generation. This model could be of independent
interest. In particular, a function is securely computable if its entropy is less than ASK capacity of an
associated secrecy model. The difference is shown to correspond to the maximum achievable rate of an
ASK which is independent of the securely computed function and, together with it, forms an ASK of
optimum rate. Also, a function that is securely computed by A can be augmented to form a SK for A
of maximum rate.
Our results extend to functions defined on a block of symbols of fixed length in an obvious manner
by considering larger alphabets composed of supersymbols of such length. However, they do not cover
functions of symbols of increasing length (in n).
In our proof of Theorem 5, g was securely computed from omniscience at all the terminals in
A ⊆M that was attained using noninteractive public communication. However, as Example 1 illustrates,
omniscience is not necessary for the secure computation of g, and it is possible to make do with
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communication of rate less than RCO(M) using an interactive protocol. A related unresolved question
is: what is the minimum rate of public communication for secure computation?
A natural generalization of the conditions for secure computability of g by A ⊆ M given here
entails a characterization of conditions for the secure computability of multiple functions g1, ..., gk by
A1, ...,Ak of M, respectively. This unsolved problem, in general, will not permit omniscience for any
Ai, i = 1, ..., k. For instance with m = 2, A1 = {1}, A2 = {2}, and X1 and X2 being independent, the
functions gi(xi) = xi, i = 1, 2, are securely computable trivially, but not through omniscience since, in
this example, public communication is forbidden for the secure computation of g1, g2.
APPENDIX A
The proof of Lemma 3 is based on [8, Lemma, Section 4], which is paraphrased first. Let the rvs
Q and R take values in the finite set Q and R, respectively. For a stochastic matrix W : Q → Q,
let {D˜1, ..., D˜l} be the ergodic decomposition (into communicating classes) (cf. e.g., [12]) of Q based
on W . Let D˜(n) denote a fixed ergodic class of Qn (the n-fold Cartesian product of Q) on the basis
of Wn (the n-fold product of W ). Let D(n) and R(n) be any (nonempty) subsets of D˜(n) and Rn,
respectively.
Lemma GK. [8] For D˜(n),D(n),R(n) as above, assume that
Pr
(
Qn ∈ D(n) | Rn ∈ R(n)
)
≥ exp[−nǫn],
Pr
(
Rn ∈ R(n) | Qn ∈ D(n)
)
≥ exp[−nǫn], (A1)
where lim
n
ǫn = 0. Then (as stated in [8, bottom of p. 157]),
Pr
(
Qn ∈ D(n))
Pr
(
Qn ∈ D˜(n)
) ≥ exp[−nκǫn log2 ǫn], (A2)
for a (positive) constant κ that depends only on the pmf of (Q,R) and on W .
A simple consequence of (A2) is that for a given ergodic class D˜(n) and disjoint subsetsD(n)1 , ...,D(n)t
of it, and subsets R(n)1 , ...,R(n)t (not necessarily distinct) of Rn, such that D(n)t′ ,R(n)t′ , t′ = 1, ..., t,
satisfy (A1), then
t ≤ exp[nκǫn log2 ǫn]. (A3)
Note that the ergodic decomposition of Qn on the basis of Wn for the specific choice
W (q|q′) =
∑
r∈R
Pr (Q = q | R = r) Pr (R = r | Q = q′) , q, q′ ∈ Q
corresponds to the set of values of mcfn(Q,R) defined by (17) [8]. Next, pick Q = Qm, R =
(Q1, ..., Qm−1), and define the stochastic matrix W : Q → Q by
W (q|q′) =
∑
α
Pr (Q = q | mcf(Q1, ..., Qm−1) = α)Pr (mcf(Q1, ..., Qm−1) = α | Q = q′) ,
q, q′ ∈ Q. (A4)
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The ergodic decomposition of Qn on the basis of Wn (with W as in (A4)) will correspond to the set
of values of mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm), recalling (16). Since ξ(n) is ǫ-recoverable from Qni , i = 1, ...,m, note
that
ξ′(n) =
(
ξ(n), mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm)
)
also is ǫ-recoverable in the same sense, recalling definition 7. This implies the existence of mappings
ξ
′(n)
i , i = 1, ...,m, satisfying
Pr
(
ξ
′(n)
1 (Q
n
1 ) = ... = ξ
′(n)
m (Q
n
m) = ξ
′(n)
)
≥ 1− ǫ. (A5)
For each fixed value c = (c1, c2) of ξ′(n), let
D(n)c =
{
qnm ∈ Qnm : ξ′(n)m (qnm) = c
}
,
R(n)c =
{
(qn1 , ..., q
n
m−1) ∈ Qn1 × ...×Qnm−1 : ξ′(n)i (qni ) = c, i = 1, ...,m− 1
}
.
Let C(ǫ) denote the set of c’s such that
Pr
(
Qn ∈ D(n)c | Rn ∈ R(n)c
)
≥ 1−√ǫ,
Pr
(
Rn ∈ R(n)c | Qn ∈ D(n)c
)
≥ 1−√ǫ. (A6)
Then, as in [8, Proposition 1], it follows from (A5) that
Pr
(
ξ′(n) ∈ C(ǫ)
)
≥ 1− 4√ǫ. (A7)
Next, we observe for each fixed c2, that the disjoint sets D(n)c1,c2 lie in a fixed ergodic class of Qn
(determined by c2). Since (A6) are compatible with the assumption (A1) for all n sufficiently large, we
have from (A3) that
‖{c1 : (c1, c2) ∈ C(ǫ)}‖ ≤ exp[nκǫn log2 ǫn], (A8)
where κ depends on the pmf of (Q1, ..., Qm) and W in (A4), and where lim
n
ǫn = 0. Finally,
1
n
H
(
ξ′(n)
)
=
1
n
H
(
ξ(n), mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm
)
≤ H (mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)) + 1
n
H
(
ξ(n),1
(
ξ′(n) ∈ C(ǫ)
)
| mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm)
)
= H (mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)) +
1
n
+
1
n
H
(
ξ(n) | mcfn(Q1, ..., Qm),1
(
ξ′(n) ∈ C(ǫ)
))
≤ H(mcf(Q1, ..., Qm)) + δn,
where lim
n
δn = 0 by (A7) and (A8).
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APPENDIX B
Considering first the achievability part, fix δ > 0. From the result for a general source network [3,
Theorem 3.1.14] it follows, as in the proof of [6, Proposition 1], that for RM ∈ R (A′, ZA′) and all n
sufficiently large, there exists a noninteractive communication F(n) = (F (n)1 , ..., F
(n)
m ) with
1
n
log ‖F(n)‖ ≤
m∑
i=1
Ri + δ,
such that XnM is ǫn-recoverable from
(
Xni , Z
n
i ,F
(n)
)
, i ∈ A′. Therefore, {mcf ((XMt, Zit)i∈A′)}nt=1
is ǫn-recoverable from
(
Xni , Z
n
i ,F
(n)
)
, i ∈ A′. The last step takes recourse to Lemma C2 in Appendix
C. Specifically, choose U = U ′ = {mcf ((XMt, Zit)i∈A′)}nt=1, U0 = U , V = constant, h = F (n),
d = n [H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′))− δ], whereby the hypothesis (C3) of Lemma C2 is satisfied for all n
sufficiently large. Fixing
r′ =
⌈
exp
[
n
(
m∑
i=1
Ri + δ
)]⌉
,
Lemma C2 implies the existence of a φ, and thereby an ASK K(n) = φ ({mcf ((XMt, Zit)i∈A′)}nt=1),
of rate
1
n
log r = H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′))−
m∑
i=1
Ri − 3δ.
In particular, we can choose
m∑
i=1
Ri ≤ RCO (A′;ZA′) + δ
2
.
Since δ was arbitrary, this establishes the achievability part.
We prove the converse part under either of the weaker conditions (7) or (8). Let K = K(n) (UM, XnM, ZnM)
be an ǫn-ASK for A′, achievable using observations of length n, randomization UM, public communi-
cation F = F (UM, XnM) and side information ZnM. Then,
1
n
H(K) ≤ 1
n
H(K | F) + ǫn. (B1)
Let Ku = K (u,XnM, ZnM) denote the random value of the ASK for a fixed UM = u. Since (XnM,K)
is ǫn-recoverable from the rvs (UM, XnM, Zni ) for each i ∈ A′,
PUM ({u : (XnM,Ku) is
√
ǫn-recoverable from (UM = u,XnM, Zni ) for each i ∈ A′ })
≥ 1−√ǫn.
(B2)
Also, for each UM = u
1
n
H (XnM,K | UM = u) =
1
n
H (XnM,Ku)
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by independence of UM and (XnM, ZnM), and therefore, by Lemma 3, for u in the set in (B2),
1
n
H (XnM,K | UM = u) ≤ H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′ )) + δn, (B3)
for all n sufficiently large and where lim
n
δn = 0. Then,
1
n
H(UM, X
n
M,K) ≤
1
n
H (UM) +H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′)) + δn +
√
ǫn log (|XM||ZM|) , (B4)
by (B2) and (B3). The proof is now completed along the lines of [6, Lemma 2 and Theorem 3].
Specifically, denoting the set of positive integers {1, ..., l} by [1, l],
1
n
H(UM, X
n
M,K) =
1
n
H(K | F) +
m∑
i=1
R′i +
1
n
H(UM),
where
R′i =
1
n
∑
ν:ν≡i mod m
H(Fν | F[1,ν−1]) +
1
n
H
(
Ui, X
n
i | F,K, U[1,i−1], Xn[1,i−1]
)
−H(Ui). (B5)
Consider B *M, A′ * B. For j ∈ A′ ∩Bc, we have
1
n
H (UB) +
1
n
H
(
XB | XnBc , Znj
)
=
1
n
H
(
UB, X
n
B | UBc , XnBc , Znj
)
=
1
n
H
(
F1, ..., Frm,K, UB, X
n
B | UBc , XnBc , Znj
)
.
Furthermore, since K is ǫn-recoverable from (F, UBc , XnBc , Znj ) and H(Fν | UBc , XnBc) = 0 for ν ≡ i
mod m with i ∈ Bc,
1
n
H
(
F1, ..., Frm,K, UB, X
n
B | UBc , XnBc , Znj
)
=
1
n
rm∑
ν=1
H
(
Fν | F[1,ν−1], UBc , XnBc , Znj
)
+
1
n
H
(
K | UBc , XnBc , Znj ,F
)
+
1
n
∑
i∈B
H
(
Ui, X
n
i | UBc∩[i+1,m], XnBc∩[i+1,m], Znj ,F,K, U[1,i−1], Xn[1,i−1]
)
≤ 1
n
∑
i∈B
[ ∑
ν:ν≡i mod m
H
(
Fν | F[1,ν−1]
)
+H
(
Ui, X
n
i | F,K, U[1,i−1], Xn[1,i−1]
)]
+
ǫn log |K|+ 1
n
≤
∑
i∈B
Ri +H(UB), (B6)
where
Ri ,
(
R′i +
ǫn log |K|+ 1
n
)
, i ∈M.
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It follows from (B1) and (B4)-(B6) that
1
n
H(K) ≤ H (mcf ((XM, Zi)i∈A′))−
m∑
i=1
Ri +
(
ǫn + δn +
ǫn log |K|+ 1
n
+
√
ǫn log (|XM||ZM|)
)
,
(B7)
where RM ∈ R (A′, ZA′) from (B6), and therefore
m∑
i=1
Ri ≥ RCO (A′, ZA′) . (B8)
Then, (B7), (B8) imply
1
n
H(K) ≤ C (A′, ZA′) +
(
ǫn + δn +
ǫn log |K|+ 1
n
+
√
ǫn log (|XM||ZM|)
)
.
The proof is completed using the second part of (8) directly, or the second part of (7) in the manner of
[6, Theorem 3]. This completes the converse part.
APPENDIX C
Our proof of achievability in Theorem 4 and sufficiency in Theorem 5 rely on a “balanced coloring
lemma” in [1]; we state below a version of it from [6].
Lemma C1. [1, Lemma 3.1] Let P be any family of N pmfs on a finite set U , and let d > 0 be such
that P ∈ P satisfies
P
({
u : P (u) >
1
d
})
≤ ǫ, (C1)
for some 0 < ǫ < (1/9). Then the probability that a randomly selected mapping φ : U → {1, ..., r}
fails to satisfy
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u:φ(u)=i
P (u)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 3ǫ,
simultaneously for each P ∈ P , is less than 2Nr exp
(
− ǫ2d3r
)
.
In contrast to the application of Lemma C1 in [6, Lemma B.2], our mentioned proofs call for
a balanced coloring of a set corresponding to a rv that differs from another rv for which probability
bounds are used. However, both rvs agree with high probability when conditioned on a set of interest.
Consider rvs U,U ′, V with values in finite sets U ,U ′,V , respectively, where U ′ is a function of U ,
and a mapping h : U → {1, . . . , r′}. For λ > 0, let U0 be a subset of U such that
(i) Pr (U ∈ U0) > 1− λ2;
(ii) given U ∈ U0, h(U) = j, U ′ = u′, V = v, there exists u = u(u′) ∈ U0 satisfying
Pr (U = u | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) =Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ,
1 ≤ j ≤ r′, v ∈ V . (C2)
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Then the following holds.
Lemma C2. Let the rvs U,U ′, V and the set U0 be as above. Further, assume that
PUV
({
(u, v) : Pr (U = u | V = v) > 1
d
})
≤ λ2. (C3)
Then, a randomly selected mapping φ : U ′ → {1, . . . , r} fails to satisfy
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v)
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 14λ, (C4)
with probability less than 2rr′|V| exp
(
− cλ3d
rr′
)
for a constant c > 0.
Proof: Using the condition (i) in the definition of U0, the left side of (C4) is bounded above by
2λ2+
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 12λ,
(C5)
with probability greater than 1− 2rr′|V| exp
(
− cλ3d
rr′
)
for a constant c > 0.
Let q = PV
({
v ∈ V : Pr (U ∈ U0|V = v) < 1−λ23
})
. Then, since
1− λ2 ≤ Pr (U ∈ U0) ≤
∑
v∈V : Pr(U∈U0|V=v)<
1−λ2
3
Pr (U ∈ U0|V = v)PV (v) + (1− q)
<
1− λ2
3
q + (1− q),
we get from the extremities above that
q <
3λ2
2
. (C6)
For u ∈ U0 and v ∈ V satisfying
Pr (U ∈ U0|V = v) ≥ 1− λ
2
3
, Pr (U = u|V = v, U ∈ U0) > 3
d(1 − λ2) , (C7)
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we have that
Pr (U = u|V = v) > 1
d
.
Therefore, by (C6) and (C3), it follows that∑
(u,v):u∈U0,Pr(U=u|V=v,U∈U0)>
3
d(1−λ2)
Pr (U = u, V = v) ≤ λ2 + q < 5λ
2
2
,
which is the same as
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
∑
u∈U0: Pr(U=u|V=v,U∈U0)>
3
d(1−λ2)
Pr (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) < 5λ
2
2
. (C8)
The bound in (C8) will now play the role of [6, inequality (50), p. 3059] and the remaining steps of
our proof, which are parallel to those in [6, Lemma B.2], are provided here for completeness.
Setting
D =
(j, v) :
∑
u∈U : Pr(U=u|V=v,U∈U0)>
3
d(1−λ2)
Pr (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≤ 5λ
2
 , (C9)
we get that ∑
(j,v)∈Dc
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) < λ. (C10)
Next, defining
E =
{
(j, v) : Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≥ λ
r′
Pr (V = v, U ∈ U0)
}
, (C11)
it holds for (j, v) ∈ E,
Pr (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≤ r
′
λ
Pr (U = u|V = v, U ∈ U0) . (C12)
Also,
∑
(j,v)∈Ec
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) < λ
r′
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (V = v, U ∈ U0)
≤ λ. (C13)
Further, for (j, v) ∈ E, if
Pr (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) > 3r
′
λd(1 − λ2) (C14)
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then from (C12), we have
Pr (U = u|V = v, U ∈ U0) > 3
d(1− λ2) . (C15)
Therefore, recalling the conditions that define U0 in (C2), we have for (j, v) ∈ E ∩D that∑
u′∈U ′:
Pr(U ′=u′|h(U)=j,V=v,U∈U0)> 3r
′
λd(1−λ2)
Pr (U ′ = u′|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
=
∑
u′∈U ′:
Pr(U=u(u′)|h(U)=j,V=v,U∈U0)> 3r
′
λd(1−λ2)
Pr (U = u(u′)|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
=
∑
u∈U :
Pr(U=u|h(U)=j,V=v,U∈U0)>
3r′
λd(1−λ2)
Pr (U = u|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
≤ 5λ
2
, (C16)
where second equality is by (C2), and the previous inequality is by (C14), (C15) and (C9). Also, using
(C10), (C13), we get ∑
(j,v)∈E∩D
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) ≥ 1− 2λ. (C17)
Now, the left side of (C5) is bounded, using (C17), as
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 4λ+
∑
(j,v)∈E∩D
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (C18)
Using (C16), the family of pmfs {Pr (U ′ = (·)|h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0) , (j, v) ∈ E ∩D} satisfies
the hypothesis (C1) of Lemma C1 with d replaced by λ(1−λ2)d3r′ and ǫ replaced by 5λ/2; assume that
0 < λ < 2/45 so as to meet the condition following (C1). The mentioned family consists of at most
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r′|V| pmfs. Therefore, using Lemma C1,
r′∑
j=1
∑
v∈V
Pr (h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)
r∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
u′∈U ′:φ(u′)=i
Pr (U ′ = u′ | h(U) = j, V = v, U ∈ U0)− 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < 23λ2
with probability greater than
1− 2rr′|V| exp
(
−25λ
3(1− λ2)d
36rr′
)
≥ 1− 2rr′|V| exp
(
−cλ
3d
rr′
)
,
for a constant c. This completes the proof of (C5), and thereby the lemma.
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